












I. Introduction: Why Aren’t Deliberative Democrats and Election Lawyers Talking? 
 
In recent years, political philosophy has been largely dominated by theories of 
deliberative democracy, such as the ones offered by Jurgen Habermas in his monumental 
Between Facts and Norms1 and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in their lucid 
Democracy and Disagreement.2  The key concept for deliberative democrats is 
conversation: the exercise of political power, according to deliberative democrats, is only 
legitimate when it is justified by conversation and (ideally) agreement with other citizens, 
based on reasons that they can all understand.3  In developing this ideal of conversation, 
deliberative democrats have been pointedly in opposition to theories of democracy that 
see the exercise of power (perhaps cynically) as simply a matter of bargaining and 
balancing interests, rather than a rule of “deliberative reason.”4  However, this has put 
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pressure on deliberative democrats to show that their theories are not merely idle 
speculation (or mere talk), but can actually be put into practice.  If the interest theory of 
democracy aimed low, at least it gave a plausible description of how democratic politics 
worked and could work.  As a result of challenges to its practicality, deliberative 
democratic theory, in the words of one prominent deliberative democrat, “has moved 
beyond the ‘theoretical statement’ stage and into the ‘working theory’ stage.”5 
Around the same time as the rise of deliberative democracy in political theory, the 
study of law was witnessing an increasing interest in the practice of elections.  Although 
Bush v. Gore6 in some ways now represents the key moment in the rise of election law as 
“its own field of study,”7 legal theorists had already been remarking on the gradual 
“constitutionalization of democratic politics.”8  According to a path-breaking Harvard 
Law Review Forward by Richard Pildes, the Supreme Court has been making decisions 
about elections that assume, even if they do not explicitly articulate, a theory about 
democratic structure: how elections should be run, who should be able to vote, etc.  In 
many cases over the past few years, Pildes says, the Supreme Court has been slowly 
developing a theory of democracy that emphasizes order and stability over robust 
competition.9  And as further evidence of the Supreme Court’s lurch into political 
theories of democracy, in an opinion involving the representation of African-Americans 
in Georgia, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor needed to rely on the work of Hannah Pitkin in 
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order to distinguish between two types of representation.10  The Court’s recent, and 
increasing, intervention into the law of elections shows, according to election scholars, 
that the Court is slowly involved in hammering out a “law of democracy.”11 
Given the evident and even patent relationship of these two fields – political 
theory and election law – and the trend of one (political theory) towards the more 
practical and the trend of the other (election law) towards theory, one would expect there 
to be a burgeoning and fruitful exchange between the two disciplines.  Deliberate 
democrats would need to be aware of the constraints on democratic decisionmaking 
imposed by Supreme Court decisions (and election law more generally) in order to make 
sure their proposals are feasible and sensitive to real-world conditions.  And election law 
theorists would need to have a grounding in political theory in order to make theoretical 
sense of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and to offer intelligent critiques of them.  In 
short, one would have expected a convergence on what Dennis Thompson has recently 
called “midrange principles,” that is, neither broad principles (on the level of deliberative 
democracy) nor simply case by case analysis (as in election law) but reflection on 
“principles of electoral justice ... and their relation to electoral institutions.”12   
Unfortunately, very little of this has taken place.  Even in the book from which I 
just quoted, Dennis Thompson does little to connect his larger theory of deliberative 
democracy to his proposed institutional changes, and his book reads more like a primer 
on election law for philosophers.  Although Thompson does a good job of identifying the 
gap in the current literature, his book has not gone a very long way towards filling it. 
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My Essay tries to show the ways in which deliberative democrats and election law 
theorists need each other.  I do so by examining in detail one proposed reform of 
American democracy along deliberative lines, offered by Bruce Ackerman and James 
Fishkin in their book Deliberation Day.13  The focus here is partial, but not, I think 
unwarranted.  Ackerman and Fishkin’s book represents a bold and rigorously formulated 
effort to make voting more reflective, and citizens more engaged in voting.  However, in 
the course of their proposals, they miss how key elements of the structure of American 
election law threaten to make “deliberation day” into less of an arena for wide-ranging 
democratic deliberation than it could be and to introduce deliberation into areas where we 
might prefer that it not be.   
In one respect, my criticism of Ackerman and Fishkin is similar to a criticism 
made about democratic theory in the abstract: it is said that deliberative democracy, 
although it purports to be inclusive, actually excludes some viewpoints, and artificially 
restricts dialogue.  For example, Bruce Ackerman’s earlier book, which emphasized 
dialogue as a way of justifying political principles, was criticized for artificially 
excluding “some certain conceptions of the good life” by “privatiz[ing] them and 
push[ing] them out of the public debate in the liberal state.”14  I do not claim that 
Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal purposefully excludes some voices, only that by 
relying on certain features of American electoral structure, they miss the ways in which 
deliberation might be biased, or unproductive, or incomplete.  The point is, no 
                                                 
13 BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004) (hereinafter DELIBERATION DAY).  
Earlier work by the two authors laid the groundwork for their collaboration.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1986); 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); and  JAMES S. 
FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991)  
14 SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF 97 (1992).  See generally MONIQUE DEVEAUX, CULTURAL 
PLURALISM AND DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE (2000).     
 5
deliberation takes place in a vacuum, and it pays to be aware of the structures that will 
inevitably dictate the direction and even sometimes the outcomes of deliberation.  In the 
case of deliberative democracy, that structure, at least in the American context, is 
provided by election law, and (at the limit) the Constitution. 
In what follows, I look at three areas of election law that Ackerman and Fishkin 
fail to appreciate.  These areas are: the law regarding political parties, political 
gerrymanders, and the racial districting.  In the first two areas (parties and political 
gerrymanders), the problem is how protection for existing political parties might skew 
deliberation towards the extremes of left and right, and work to exclude voices that might 
be diverge from the lines of the two major parties.  Interestingly, Ackerman and Fishkin 
not only do not challenge the two party system, they even embrace it, using the major 
political parties as key functionaries in the management of “deliberation day.”  In the 
third area (race), the problem is more subtle.  It involves the question of whether 
deliberation of the kind favored in Deliberation Day is in tension with deliberation at 
another level, namely at the level of Congress.  Sometimes, in the pursuit of better 
deliberation at a different level, we might prefer that there be less citizen-level 
deliberation rather than more.  For example, we might want to guarantee some “safe” 
minority Congressional seats, which may contribute to better deliberation at the 
Congressional level because of the presence of more diverse voices.   
Ackerman and Fishkin’s relative neglect of these important areas of election law 
point points to a larger theme that I want to sound in my paper, which is the following.  
Sometimes there will be inevitable trade-offs between the kinds of deliberation we want.  
Do we want better deliberation at the citizen level, or at the representative level?  We 
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may have to choose.  So too, we might have to choose between deep debate between two 
parties, and a more wide-ranging debate between multiple parties in a presidential 
election.  And again: there may be a choice we have to make between inadequate 
deliberation now, and better deliberation later.  Should we choose in favor of immediate 
yet inadequate deliberation, or do we wait for more structural reforms to be made?  There 
are trade-offs that election law forces us to make, I argue, and it pays to be aware of those 
trade-offs.  What Ackerman and Fishkin implicitly do is to make certain choices in their 
proposal for one electoral regime over the other without justifying their choices.  But 
greater attention to the current structure of American election law can make us aware of 
the costs and benefits of choosing one deliberative regime over another.  It can also show 
us that in each of these three cases, the implicit choices that Ackerman and Fishkin will 
result in worse deliberation rather than better deliberation.     
Finally, my paper tries to show that attention to the structure of American election 
law teaches us another key lesson, which is that sometimes the best means to get to the 
ideal of deliberation are not to be achieved by more deliberation.  Ackerman and Fishkin 
work from the bottom-up.  They believe that if citizens are more deliberative, then the 
President and Congress and politics more generally will be more deliberative, that if 
deliberation day succeeds, “everything else would change.”15   Better deliberation among 
citizens would have effects across the entire political structure, from the quality of 
candidates to the influence of money to the structure of political parties.16  My suggestion 
is that top-down reforms are also necessary, and in some cases need to take priority over 
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deliberative ends, if we want to achieve some of the goals Ackerman and Fishkin (and I) 




I propose to consider the relationship between theories of deliberative democracy 
by looking closely at one particular proposal, viz., the idea for deliberation day defended 
and articulated by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin.  Why this one?  Certainly there 
are other proposals, such as Ethan Leib’s suggestion of a fourth branch of government.17   
Two reasons counsel in favor of choosing Ackerman and Fishkin (apart from the fact that 
it seems to me the proposal most fully worked out and imagined).  First, Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s proposal is bold and comprehensive, affecting at the limit both presidential and 
congressional elections.  Its sweep and its radicalness allow us to see the defects 
institutionalizing deliberative democracy might have in especially bright relief: the 
problems with deliberative democracy and election law will show up here, whereas they 
might not be as obvious in smaller scale, incremental reforms.  At the same time, 
Ackerman and Fishkin’s “deliberation day” experiment seems at the same time realistic – 
they themselves characterize it as an exercise in “realistic idealism.”18  By this, I mean 
not only that they take seriously questions of cost and implementation, but also that 
deliberation experiments have been made, on a large scale by Fishkin’s deliberative 
polling19 and on smaller scale in communities in Colorado and Connecticut.  If I am right 
about some of my criticisms of the larger scale program, this will give us reason to look 
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18 DELIBERATION DAY 13-4. 
19 FISHKIN, supra note 13. 
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more carefully at the smaller, more incremental instantiations of deliberation day.   It is 
hard to imagine small steps to a fourth branch of government.20  So, oddly, both because 
of its boldness and its potential for immediate realizability, Ackerman and Fishkin’s 
proposal seems the best one to analyze.  Its boldness will make its errors (should there be 
any) easier to spot, and its immediate realizability makes it the one that we should give 
closest scrutiny because, at a smaller scale, it is already being used. 
What then is the proposal?21  Ackerman and Fishkin propose that we set aside a 
national holiday, before elections (first for presidential elections, and then later on, for 
Congressional elections as well), for citizens to debate the issues of the campaign.  The 
process of preparing for deliberation day begins one month before the actual date, by 
asking the candidates to identify one or two “important issues” confronting the nation.  
“Within a two-party framework,” Ackerman and Fishkin write, “this query will generate 
two to four themes that will structure the conversational run-up to Deliberation Day,” 
which is held about two weeks before elections.22  On “Deliberation Day” itself, the two 
(in this case, presidential) candidates will debate, and citizens will gather in groups 
throughout the nation to watch the debate.  After the debate is done, the groups that have 
met to watch the debate will break up into still smaller groups (of fifteen or so).  The 
(smaller) groups of fifteen will debate among themselves for forty-five minutes, and 
choose questions to ask the representatives of the campaigns in their larger group “citizen 
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assembly.”  In the citizen assembly itself, a moderator will ask “local party officials”23 
questions selected from the list of questions prepared by the smaller groups.   After lunch, 
the citizens again meet with their small groups, make a list of supplemental questions, 
which are then asked of party representatives at a second citizen assembly.  The citizens 
meet in small groups a last time, and deliberation day is over.  Two weeks later, they 
vote.     
Ackerman and Fishkin make no bones about the demands such an arrangement 
would place on party organization.  As is clear from the description of deliberation day, 
much depends on the citizens’ assembly – where local party officials answer questions 
from the gathered small groups.  Indeed, Ackerman and Fishkin tout it as one of the 
benefits that it will revitalize local party organization.  “For the first time in a long time,” 
they write, “it will no longer make sense for presidential campaigns to operate 
independently of local party organizations.”  “How else,” they continue, “will they be 
able to find tens of thousands of respected local leaders to represent the national 
candidate at the citizen assemblies?”24  But such a demand for personnel, it seems almost 
too obvious to state, will only be able to be met by the well established political parties, 
i.e., Republicans and Democrats.  It would be impossible for third parties – even third 
parties will some national following – to be able to compete with the major parties in 
providing people to represent them on deliberation day.  And the lack of a representative 
will be obvious: the two parties will have their representatives, fielding questions and 
answering them, while the third party candidate will have no one to defend him or her 
(even if the candidate does well in the debate), simply because they lack the people.  
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Ackerman and Fishkin’s mention, in a footnote, that should a third party candidate win 
the support of “15 percent or more of the votes in leading opinion polls” then he or she 
would be eligible for deliberation day (20 percent for Congressional races).25  But this 
restriction seems almost an afterthought, insensitive to the organizational demands 
deliberation day would put on any but the two major parties.  Even were a third party 
candidate able to poll well in the run up to election day, this still wouldn’t be sufficient to 
make up for the lack of organizational and managerial support.  
Why does this matter?  It matters because it affects the quality and the diversity of 
deliberation on deliberation day, by further entrenching the advantage the two major 
parties have in getting their message out.  If no one shows up to represent the third party 
candidate at deliberation day (supposing that the third party candidate wins the required 
fifteen percent in public opinion polls), it will not only make the third party look bad, 
because no one will be there to defend the candidate’s position on issues or to articulate 
them further in response to questions, but the citizens in the citizens’ assembly will be 
deprived of the opinions and the facts that the third-party candidate representative could 
bring to the table.  Debate will be poorer, because not representative of the full range of 
opinion.  Although the questions asked to representatives of the two major parties might 
be influenced by the presences of the third party candidate in the televised debate (again, 
if that candidate had 15 percent support in the polls), the fact that the major party 
representatives would be the only ones there to debate and answer the questions will 
affect how that question is treated.  Imagine how the moderator of the citizen assembly 
will have to announce to the citizen assembly that “Regrettably, there is no one here to 
defend the (Green, Conservative, etc.) party, so you will only be able to ask questions of 
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the Democrat and Republican representatives.”  Alexander Meiklejohn famously stated 
the ideal of democratic debate was a debate in which everything that was worth saying 
was said.26  In the world of deliberation day, only that gets said which has sufficient 
institutional support. 
The point here is a structural one: it is about how the structure of deliberation day 
focuses debate in a certain way, and maintains the two-party system and prevents serious 
challenges to it.  Deliberation day does not merely reproduce those difficulties but 
amplifies them: first, by restricting the televised debate to only those candidates who can 
get 15 percent approval in the polls27 and second, by erecting a practical barrier against 
representation in the citizen assemblies.  And in doing this, Ackerman and Fishkin, with 
or without realizing it, are siding with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in this area, 
which has in many ways helped foster the continued entrenchment of the major parties.  
In Richard Pildes’ telling, the bias in the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence has 
been towards protecting major parties, and their distinctiveness.  This two-party 
entrenchment has been visible in many ways, from the Court preventing parties from 
opening their primaries to independent voters, to keeping third parties off the ballot and 
making it harder for them to participate in televised debates.  From the Supreme Court’s 
perspective, according to Pildes and others, the goal is for stable elections, in the sense of 
avoiding the potential “disorder” and “confusion” of multiparty and multi-candidate 
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elections.28  These decisions show the way that, in Pildes words, “constitutional law now 
limits the structural changes through which disaffection with the current practices of 
democratic politics can be given institutional expression.”29  The current system 
entrenches the two parties, by allowing them to use the system of elections to stack the 
deck in their favor, if they are the party in power, or to benefit incumbents generally, or 
simply to exclude third parties, or efforts to make the two parties more receptive to 
independent voters. 
It is not clear, as I have intimated, that Ackerman and Fishkin will want to 
embrace this trend.  It is even less clear that they should want to embrace this trend.  
Again, if the goal is deliberation, this goal might not be furthered by excluding third 
parties from the debate, and allowing the two parties to have the entire field to 
themselves, if not in the televised debate, then almost certainly in most citizen 
assemblies, where third parties will not have the infrastructure to support “opinion 
leaders for their team on Deliberation Day.”30  But the point goes deeper than this.  It is 
that, if the structure of deliberation day does not work against the entrenchment of the 
two parties (and the subsequent limiting of debate) than it unwittingly furthers that 
entrenchment.  What Ackerman and Fishkin see as revitalizing local party politics is, 
viewed from another angle, simply exploiting the disadvantages third parties have in 
entering into the political process.31  Nor can the Ackerman and Fishkin proposal be seen 
as dictated by necessity, say, by avoiding too many candidates.  Certainly deliberation 
                                                 
28 Richard Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in THE VOTE 140 (Cass Sunstein & Richard Epstein, eds. 
2001). 
29 Pildes, Constituitionalizing Democratic Politics in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION, 155 (Ronald Dworkin, 
ed. 2002). 
30 DELIBERATION DAY 32.   
31 For a good overview of different theories about the role of parties in a democracy, see Nathaniel Persily 
& Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 775 (2000). 
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day could bear three or even four presidential candidates, which suggests that the poll 
number for entry could be set lower (or made by other criteria, for example if the 
candidates had polled at a certain percentage in the previous presidential election).  
Further, even if third parties were not invited to the debate, they could participate in other 
ways, say, by being allowed to put one issue in front of the major party candidates – 
something which under Ackerman and Fishkin’s regime is wholly under the discretion of 
the two major party candidates.  Finally, more citizen assemblies could be televised, to 
reduce the need for massive numbers of party members necessary to have one show up at 
each assembly.   Again, the point is not that these proposals are obviously correct, but 
that they can be made, which shows that Ackerman and Fishkin made choices about how 
to structure deliberation, and that structure works to the detriment of allowing certain 
voices into the debate, hurting not only the excluded parties, but also the possibility of 
robust deliberation itself.  In doing so, they violate a condition on successful deliberation 
that they themselves introduce, the Meiklejohnian idea of “normative completeness”: the 
idea that for full and robust debate there must be “confrontation with a series of different 
views.”32 
Ackerman and Fishkin could reply that they are doing the best that they can to 
deepen deliberation within the two party system, rather than to find ways in which to 
accommodate other parties.33  This is a defensible position, but it needs defending.  We 
would need, from Ackerman and Fishkin, a defense of an ideal of deliberation that puts a 
premium on having two political parties debate, rather than having three or four 
candidates share the stage.  It is not obvious that two candidates are better than three or 
                                                 
32 Id. at 182.     
33 [Footnote omitted for blind review] 
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four, especially if the tendency for the two major parties is to move ineluctably towards 
the center.  Deliberation over an increasingly narrow set of differences does not seem to 
exhaust the possibilities of robust deliberation.  Indeed, Ackerman and Fishkin may share 
this view: they speak (wistfully?) of a Green party candidate making a run in the year 
2020.34  But the point of the preceding is that the structure of deliberation day gives the 
major parties an advantage and may even preclude any third party candidate gaining 
momentum.  It is no good to hope for a possibility that their very proposal makes it 
harder to obtain. 
 
III. Gerrymandered Districts 
 
In the last part, I looked at how Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal arguably 
limited debate, rather than expanded it, by instituting a deliberative structure that in effect 
(if not by intention) excluded third parties from deliberation.  The focus there was on 
what was the topic of deliberation: would it be the proposals and ideas of the two major 
parties, which already enjoy a huge institutional advantage?  Or would it be the concerns 
of third parties, who are often limited by not even being able to get on the ballot in some 
races?  In other words, the question was, who decides what concerns get on the table?  
My thesis was that by making certain choices, Ackerman and Fishkin, did not fight two 
party entrenchment, but rather increased it.  But there is another way that debate can be 
limited, not by restricting what options get on the table, what the content of the debate is 
(whether it will be the issues of the two major parties or of third parties), but by the 
selection of who among the citizens (rather than the candidates) will participate in the 
                                                 
34 DELIBERATION DAY 166. 
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debate.  There are many ways that we could approach this issue with relation to 
Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal.  Here we might reference commonplace (but 
nonetheless valid) objections to deliberative democracy that it favors those who are well 
educated and articulate, as opposed to those who lack effective speaking skills, who may 
be less inclined to voice their concerns on deliberation day.35   
We might also note the evident class bias in a sentence such as this one, when 
Ackerman and Fishkin consider what might be the cost of using schools as spaces for 
deliberation day activity: “The answer is straightforward once you recall that the schools 
are already closed on Presidents Day while kids join their parents for ski weekends and 
holiday sales.”36  The possibility that some school-age children and their parents might 
have jobs and need to work on Presidents Day does not seem to enter Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s ken.  Nor, one might suspect, do they take seriously how workers at jobs where 
they have little autonomy might feel about using their time off to deliberate rather than 
staying on the job.37 
So there may be ways in which deliberation day “selects out” certain people from 
the class of deliberators.  It may do this even though everyone shows up, by giving an 
implicit preference to those who are more articulate, or it may do it by putting barriers up 
against some people from showing up in the first place, by not effectively countering the 
(legitimate) incentives some may have to stay away from deliberation day and work, for 
instance.  But these are not the problems I want to focus on, although it is clear that they 
                                                 
35 Richard Posner makes some of these points in his review of Deliberation Day.  See Richard Posner, 
Smooth Sailing, LEGAL. AFF. (January 2004) (“I sense a power grab by the articulate class whose 
comparative advantage is—deliberation”).   
36 DELIBERATION DAY, 136.    
37 Ackerman and Fishkin mention at several points problems about childcare, but offer no real proposal to 
deal with the (obvious) problem.   
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deserve more detailed treatment.38  Moreover, it is not clear that these kinds of problems 
affect deliberation day uniquely, as opposed to any effort at encouraging deliberation.  
Further, they do not touch on the present concern of this paper, which is to show how the 
structure of election law may make a difference to how citizens deliberate on deliberation 
day, as opposed to how social or other facts may influence deliberation.  This is a more 
general concern. 
To turn to the concern of this paper: How might the structure of American 
elections dictate who participates in deliberation day?  In order to get at what I think is a 
problem in the Ackerman/Fishkin proposal, I first need to describe the background to 
their extension of deliberation day past presidential elections, into “Congress day.”39  For 
presidential elections, the groupings of citizens in large assemblies can be done based on 
convenience.  Although Ackerman and Fishkin do not give much in the way of detail on 
this point, we can assume that people will meet at places that are near to then, or 
accessible via public transportation; they may even join friends at some deliberation 
forum, even if it is not very close to where they live.  It does not matter, at least for 
presidential elections, that people from various parts of a state (or even from out of the 
state) meet to debate and discuss the positions of the two major party presidential 
candidates.  But location becomes relevant when it comes to Congress day.  Since 
citizens will be voting for their Congressperson to represent their locality, they will be 
meeting and debating only with other people in their state (in the case of Senators) or in 
their districts (in the case of Congressman).  Here, local boundaries matter, and we 
cannot accept the fluid boundaries that might be the norm in presidential elections.  In the 
                                                 
38 See generally Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, in DEBATING 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 102 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett, eds. 2003). 
39 DELIBERATION DAY, CH. 5. 
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end, one can only vote for a representative in one’s own district.  And geographical 
boundaries matter in a good way: they matter because they will dictate that certain 
matters of genuinely local concern will be on the agenda, rather than a generic and broad 
national agenda. 
So Ackerman and Fishkin propose that for Congressional elections there also be a 
deliberation day, albeit on a smaller scale.  But Ackerman and Fishkin are aware that 
there is a problem with Congressional races that does not affect the presidential race, and 
which reflects the point made in the previous paragraph.  In the presidential races, 
barriers between districts don’t matter much: it won’t make a difference whether you 
attend the deliberation day meeting in your own district or the neighboring one, or 
perhaps even one in another state.  In the case of Congressional races, state and local 
districts matter, and because of partisan gerrymandering, some districts will involve races 
that are simply not competitive.40  Districts will lean heavily towards the Democratic or 
Republican party, with the result that it may  not pay for the other party even to put up a 
candidate, or to give more than merely token opposition to the candidate who benefits 
from the gerrymander.   Ackerman and Fishkin even go so far as to say that if there is no 
major party challenger in a race, “the celebration should be canceled if polls show that 
third-party candidates have failed to gain the support of 20 percent of likely voters.”41  
Notice again that even when they are attentive to a structural problem that can affect the 
outcome of elections (partisan gerrymanders), Ackerman and Fishkin fail again and again 
to give possible third-party candidates any breaks.  But this ignores how third-party 
                                                 
40 As has been said: “you think that on election day, you get to pick your representative.  In fact, what 
happens is that in districting, your representatives pick you.”  For an overview of the current election law 
debate on partisan gerrymanders, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where do Draw the Line?: 
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2004). 
41 DELIBERATION DAY 105. 
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candidates may benefit in a disproportionate way by being part of a deliberation day –  it 
may give them the publicity they need to be taken seriously.  If a major party fields a 
candidate, however token, deliberation day takes place.  If a third party candidate polls 
fifteen percent, and is the only opponent against a major party candidate, deliberation day 
is cancelled.42   
Suppose, however, that there is a race between congressional candidates of the 
two major parties, in a district that has been gerrymandered along political lines, that is, 
where one candidate enjoys a huge advantage because the district has been designed to 
hold candidates from his or her own party.43  Now there may be a problem not only with 
who the citizens are exposed to, both in their small groups and in the citizens’ assemblies, 
but with the composition of the citizens themselves.   By hypothesis, we have assumed 
we are in a gerrymandered district, which means that most of the people attending 
deliberation day will be of the same party and more generally of the same ideological 
disposition. We now have the conditions set for what Cass Sunstein has famously called 
“group polarization.”44  By being exposed to people who share opinions and who know 
facts that support one side of the debate (and who do not know the facts that may support 
the other side) groups that deliberate together, Sunstein suggests, will tend toward the 
extremes of their positions.  Right-wing groups that deliberate together will become more 
right-wing; ditto with left-wing groups.   The point is that the structure of elections on the 
Congressional level creates the circumstances for deliberation not to be open, but to have 
                                                 
42 In some states, this also may make a difference in whether third parties get on the ballot in subsequent 
elections.   
43 Note that there will be districts that are “packed” with all members of the party either because the 
majority party wants to have a safe margin of victory in that district, or because they are trying to put all of 
the other party’s voters in a single district (to reduce their chances of winning other districts).   
44 See Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) and 
Cass Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 80 (James S. 
Fishkin & Peter Laslett, eds. 2003). 
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it tend towards ever more close-mindedness and strident opinions.  Sunstein and some of 
his co-authors have confirmed this hypothesis in experiments designed to mimic initially 
polarized debating.  True to the hypothesis, deliberators who were already leaning in a 
similar way (as citizens in partisan districts are) became more extreme in their original 
positions.45  
Ackerman and Fishkin address Sunstein’s worry about the pathologies of 
deliberation, i.e., how polarization can make deliberation a vehicle for “groupthink and 
issue polarization.”46  But there responses to Sunstein are flawed in a number of respects.  
First, they refer only to Sunstein’s early studies on polarization among jurors.  Ackerman 
and Fishkin are right to notice that the context of jury deliberation and deliberation day 
are different, but Sunstein has since replicated his findings in contexts that more resemble 
what deliberation day would look like.47  Second, and more importantly, they respond to 
Sunstein only in the case of presidential deliberation day, and not on congressional 
deliberation day.  But for reasons I explored above, geographical boundaries are much 
more salient when it comes to Congressional races, and the conditions in some 
congressional races will exactly mimic those conditions in which Sunstein finds an 
increasing polarization of voters.  Third, even if deliberators on deliberation day do not 
have to reach a conclusion or take a side on an issue, polarization may still affect what 
issues get discussed in the first place, and what sorts of things candidates should care 
about.  This will create pressure towards polarization, even if it is not convergence on a 
single answer or position.  Last, Ackerman and Fishkin say that issue polarization and 
                                                 
45 David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened on Deliberation Day? (June 21, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=911646.   
46 DELIBERATION DAY 61-5.   
47 See Schakade, Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 43. 
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groupthink will be minimized when deliberators shift from their small groups to the large 
assembly and back again.  But this would be true more of the presidential debates, where 
we can expect people from all over and who will not have been pre-selected for their 
ideological leanings.  This is not the case, as we have seen, when we consider partisan 
districts.  And indeed, the shift from large groups (where the minority party candidate 
will at least have a voice) back to small groups (where it is only citizens who will be 
primarily from the majority party, by hypothesis) may work to counteract dissent, by 
snuffing it out when the citizens return to their small groups. 
To be fair, Ackerman and Fishkin are aware of the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering, and they recommend, in an aside, “relying on a nonpartisan commission 
to draw district lines.”48  This, however, is in reference to the problem that many races 
will be non-competitive, and deliberation day may have to be canceled when there is no 
major party candidate and the third party candidate does not poll more than twenty 
percent.  My claim above has been that there is a problem in a gerrymandered district, 
and not simply because of lack of competition.  This is a problem with the candidates.  
There may also be a problem, though, with the composition of the group of citizens who 
deliberate, even when there are two major party candidates running.  The point once more 
is a structural one.  If we are to have robust deliberation, the composition of the group 
deliberating should be a certain way, and the structure of American law gives us good 
reason, in the context of Congressional races at least, that the conditions for robust 
deliberation will not be present.  Indeed, deliberation might even be counterproductive: 
resulting in people to shift to even more extreme positions, based on the limited 
information and the group pressures they confront on deliberation day.  It suggests, 
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indeed, that Ackerman and Fishkin’s optimism about the effects of deliberation is 
misguided.  Ackerman and Fishkin write that, “if deliberation day succeeded, everything 
else would change: the candidates, the media, the activists, the interests groups …”49  
However, if deliberation occurs in a context where citizens become more extreme – such 
as in a successfully gerrymandered district – everything would not change, and 
polarization could become worse.  All of this suggests that if we do not attend to 
structural problems first and work from the top down, rather than expect deliberation to 
effect changes from the bottom up, deliberation will simply not have the benefits 
Ackerman and Fishkin promise.50  In other words, there will be a trade-off between 
immediate deliberation, and better deliberation.51     
 
IV: Race and Representation 
 
In the previous two sections, I looked at whether the structure of election law 
might not work against better deliberation, rather than for it.  In part I, I considered that 
the proposal by Ackerman and Fishkin might further entrench the two parties, by giving 
an advantage to them because of their pre-existing institutional advantages.  The result 
would be that third parties, which already struggle in presidential elections, would be 
locked out of deliberation day.  In part II, I suggested that the pattern of districting in 
America meant that deliberation among citizens in gerrymandered districts might lead to 
                                                 
49 DELIBERATION DAY 3.   
50 The Supreme Court has so far avoided deciding that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.  For a 
comprehensive statement of the Court’s refusal to intervene, see the majority opinion (authored by Antonin 
Scalia) in Vieth v. Jubelirer 124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004).   
51 Why would we favor immediate, poorer deliberation over later deliberation?  Perhaps we felt that 
deliberation (even bad deliberation) had a legitimating function, as opposed to merely being a device to 
produce better decisions.  This would make no deliberation worse than even polarized deliberation.  
 22
what Cass Sunstein has called “group polarization.”  Ackerman and Fishkin, admittedly, 
do recognize the problem of partisan gerrymandering in the abstract, and make 
recommendations about what to do about it.  But the point is one of priority.  Should we 
go ahead and have citizens start deliberating, or should we first look at the structures of 
American election law that might limit deliberation, or cause the deliberation to be less 
than ideal?   
In this Part, I take up a concern which is in a way orthogonal to the discussion of 
the previous two sections.  In the previous two sections, I took for granted that having 
better citizen deliberation was desirable.  The question was only, does Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s proposal seem likely to make deliberation better, given the structure of election 
law, or to make it worse?  Now, in this Part, I want to consider the different question of 
whether more citizen deliberation is always better.  What do I mean by this question?  I 
mean, in the first instance, that there may be some goals that we would want to promote 
that more deliberation would hinder.  In this case, we would not want to maximize citizen 
deliberation, but to restrict it.  Indeed, as I go on to suggest in this Part, there may be a 
trade-off in terms of levels of deliberation.52  Limiting deliberation at one level may lead 
to the election of a representative who at another level (at the level of legislative debate, 
say) might make for better deliberation.  Again, in thinking about this problem, I take my 
example from the structure of American election law; in this case, it involves the question 
of ensuring minority representation.  Here, I want to propose, we do not merely have a 
potential question about whether deliberation as a value should trump other values, but a 
                                                 
52 In Parts I and II, by contrast, the question was about trade-offs between kinds of deliberation: two party 
or multiparty?  Polarized or not? 
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question about whether deliberation at another, higher level, should be preferred over 
better citizen deliberation. 
At least since the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1964, there has been a concern 
to elect more minority representatives, and this has been done by drawing districts that 
are majority minority – sometimes referred to as “safe” minority districts.53   At one 
angle, this is simply a matter of rectifying a past wrong: districts had been historically 
drawn to deprive blacks of the ability to elect a candidate of their choice.  On this 
understanding of the need for majority minority districts, the point of drawing districts 
favorable to black candidates, would, in principle, become otiose once it was felt that the 
past wrong was completely, or nearly completely rectified.  But we might consider 
another justification for race-conscious districting, apart from the desire to right past 
wrongs, and give blacks an electoral voice where they have previously been deprived of 
one.  We might think that having a diversity of voices at the legislative level is a good 
thing in itself, and so electing minority candidates would be good for this reason.  This 
justification of race-conscious districting can be found in the Supreme Court’s recent 
affirmation action cases, for instance.54  It is better that students be exposed to diverse 
viewpoints and positions, and this goal can be served in part by instituting affirmative 
action policies.  We can imagine a similar claim on the level of race-conscious districting.  
And, what is more, it is not too hard to see this argument being made in terms of 
increasing the quality of diversity at the legislative level: the more diverse the debating 
body, the better the quality of debate.   
                                                 
53 For a history of the Voting Rights Act and its aftermath, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES 
COUNT? (1987).   
54 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 549 U.S. 479 (2003) (holding that diversity might be considered as essential to a 
university’s educational mission).   
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Bracket, for the moment, the precise merits of this argument for majority 
minority, or “safe” districts; one does not have to be persuaded of it to see that it might 
have some claim to our assent, and more importantly, to how we think about elections.  
What we should notice at this point is that should we agree that increasing the quality of 
deliberation at the legislative level (and we think increasing minority representation 
would contribute to this goal), then we might have to achieve this through limiting debate 
at the citizen level, or at least potentially diminishing its quality.  Better deliberation on 
one level may mean worse deliberation on another level.  But now what we have is a 
tension between levels of deliberation: what might lead to better deliberation at one level 
(the representative level) might only be achieved by making deliberation worse at another 
level (the level of citizens).   Importantly, the trade-off is not between deliberation and 
some other value (national security) but about a tension between two levels at which 
deliberation should occur.  What level should we prefer?   
To make this more problem concrete, consider the Supreme Court’s pivotal 
decision on race districting, Georgia v. Ashcroft.55   At issue in that case was Georgia’s 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, which as interpreted by the Court, required that 
certain “covered” (i.e., covered by the Voting Rights Act)  states not “retrogress” when it 
came to minority representation, when they are proposing a change in the districting plan 
of a state.  The issue, in the case, was what retrogression really meant.  Did it mean that 
the number of minority representatives in Georgia had to stay the same under the new 
districting plan?  Or could a new districting plan allow for minority representation in 
other ways, such as through the creation of districts where black voters might have the 
potential to shift an electoral outcome, rather than control it (so-called “influence” 
                                                 
55 Georgia v. Ashcroft 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
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districts)?  The decision of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, ruled that Georgia’s plan, although it did not necessarily keep the same 
number of districts that were certain to elect black candidates, it was permissible.  Why?  
It was OK, she said, if a state wanted to try a districting plan that would try to preserve 
minority representation by creating “coalition” or “influence” districts, as opposed to 
maintaining districts which guaranteed that black candidates were elected.  Citing 
Hannah Pitkin, she argued that “descriptive” representation was not the only kind of 
representation we should try to secure; we should also treat favorably plans that would 
help “substantive representation as well.”56  The strategy evinced by the Georgia plan, 
O’Connor wrote, “has the potential to increase ‘substantive representation’ in more 
districts, by creating coalitions of voters who will together help to achieve the electoral 
aspirations of the minority group.”57 
 Note the language of Justice O’Connor’s opinions: one point in favor of the 
Georgia plan is that enables coalitions of voters to work together to endorse a shared 
candidate.  From this language, we might be able to see her opinion as one which 
Ackerman and Fishkin would approve of.  By creating “influence” districts, where black 
voters may influence the vote, but not determine it, citizens will be forced to deliberate 
with one another, to create coalitions across racial lines in order to elect a candidate that 
will represent both of their sets of interests.58  Citizen deliberation, on this plan, we can 
surmise, would be increased.  But the tradeoff to this is that a candidate might be elected 
who did not adequately represent minority interests.  The result of having to bargain and 
                                                 
56 Id. at PIN. 
57 Id. at PIN. 
58 In the words of another opinion, diverse groups would have to “pull, haul, and trade to find common 
political ground.”  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).   
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deliberate with other citizens might mean that the minority preferred candidate might lose 
(as O’Connor acknowledges59).  This might mean that minority interests are not fully 
represented at the Congressional level.  It might also meant that deliberation at the 
Congressional level might well be poorer: a candidate who represents a coalition of 
interests may have less of a defined viewpoint than a candidate who is elected from a 
majority minority district, and who has the freedom, perhaps, to take positions that would 
not otherwise be represented in Congress. 
So here we have a potential tradeoff within the value of deliberation, as opposed 
to trade-offs in the kind or quality of deliberation.  Which level of deliberation should we 
prefer?  Should we limit some citizen deliberation – such as the coalition building that 
might result from the creation of influence districts – in order to make possible better and 
more diverse deliberation at another level?  To be sure, much of the above argument 
depends on premises that are controversial, e.g., that coalitions could not recognize that 
minority candidates might be a good thing, and that representatives from safe minority 
districts will necessarily bring a diverse viewpoint from Congress.  But the point is larger 
than the particular example.  The point is the structural one about levels of deliberation, 
which we have to consider so long as we are not merely talking about direct democracy, 
but about representative democracy.60  Once we have another level, we inevitably have to 
consider the relationship between the two levels, and this problem will emerge in many 
different contexts.  Indeed, we might have even considered the question in terms of 
partisan gerrymandered districts.  Is it better to have voters become more extreme, so that 
those candidates with more extreme viewpoints will be elected to Congress?  I did not 
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60 On the relation of direct and representative democracy, see Michael Neblo, Thinking Through 
Democracy 3 ACTA POLITICA 10-11 (2005).  
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consider this issue in the context of partisan gerrymandered districts, because I assumed 
(perhaps mistakenly) that an excess of partisanship in representative deliberations might 
be a vice, where with minority districts, it is an open question whether we might want to 
increase the number of blacks and Latinos in Congress, not merely for the sake of 
remedying past exclusion, but for the sake of deliberation that takes the interests of many 
different sorts of constituents into account.         
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
In closing, I want to put my criticisms of Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal in 
some context, to make clear the aim of those criticisms, and their limits.  I have four 
points to make.  First, my criticisms are surely not made in the spirit of undermining the 
whole idea of deliberation day.  Indeed, I think something like deliberation day is very 
promising and my criticisms could be read in a way to suggest emendations to Ackerman 
and Fishkin’s idea.  For third parties, I offered that they (third parties) might be able to 
supply some of the issues that the deliberators on deliberation day undertake to discuss, 
even if the third party candidate does not poll the required 15 percent.  More deeply, I 
wondered whether third party candidates might be invited to the debate, even if they have 
not reached 15 percent in the polls.  This might serve the interests of deliberation by 
exposing the deliberators to more points of view.61  With partisan gerrymandering, 
Ackerman and Fishkin agree that this problem needs to be addressed; my only 
emendation to their proposal was that failure to address this problem first might result in 
                                                 
61 In fact, I would favor inviting the third party candidate to the debate, even if the other parts of 
deliberation day were kept the same. 
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deliberation being less productive and more skewed than it otherwise might be.   So far 
from a deep disagreement between me and Ackerman and Fishkin, this is a comparatively 
minor family squabble about priorities.  As for the problem of race and elections, this is a 
deep one, and it is no fault of deliberation day that it does not solve it.  Perhaps one 
simply has to make a choice between robust citizen deliberation and diversity of 
representation.  Or perhaps one could find a solution that would be able to reconcile these 
two levels of deliberation.  All of this is to say that none of the three major points above 
are addressed globally, at the very idea of a deliberation day.  These points, instead, are 
meant to show that if deliberation day does not recognize and address the structure of 
American election law, its aims and its purposes might be frustrated.  And this is an 
argument that is done in the spirit of those aims and purposes. 
 Of course, Ackerman and Fishkin may disagree with the direction these proposals 
could take us.  This takes me to the second point I want to emphasize.  Ackerman and 
Fishkin may feel that it is better to have deep and robust two party debates, because 
offering voters two clearly defined choices is better than having a cacophony of many 
voices in a discussion.  They might prefer even polarized discussion on Congress day to 
no debate at all.  And they might reject the idea that it is better to limit citizen debate in 
order to have more diverse debate at the level of representatives.  All of these options are 
perfectly defensible.  The point that my paper suggests is that they need a defense, 
because there are other options available.  When Ackerman and Fishkin make a proposal 
that opts for one of these conceptions of debate, they are pushing other options off the 
table.  In the words of my title: they are opting for one horn of several dilemmas that 
exist between kinds and levels of deliberation.  In the same way, the present structure of 
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American election law makes trade-offs, by entrenching two party candidates, by 
allowing partisan gerrymanders, and constructing minority “safe” districts.  This system 
is again defensible, but it needs a defense, in terms of the two party system, in terms of 
the good of diverse debate, etc.  I have intimated throughout this paper that perhaps a 
defense of the system can be made in terms of a certain ideal of deliberation.62  But, as I 
have also stressed, that ideal of deliberation is not the only one out there.       
My third clarification may already be implicit in what I have said, but it is 
important to bring out.  Recently, there have been many critics of the good of deliberation 
itself.  It is hopelessly misguided, it is argued, to think that deliberation between citizens 
can ever really be productive.  For example, in a recent book, Fernando Teson and Guido 
Pincione argue that “political deliberation does not serve cognitive goals, and it often 
drives us further from the truth.”63  I do not share the pessimism of these authors.  Or 
rather, I do not share their pessimism about the possibilities of democratic deliberation.  
Ackerman and Fishkin make a powerful case that our current state of deliberation is very 
poor; but this does not mean that it cannot change.  The problem, Ackerman and Fishkin 
claim, is one of how politics is currently organized, and not about the intrinsic 
possibilities or limitations of deliberative rationality.  Politics is not currently organized 
around rational persuasion, but rather around sound bites.   By proposing deliberation 
day, Ackerman and Fishkin aim to make giving arguments the center of campaigns: it 
puts a premium on articulating positions that will stand the test of questioning and 
discussion.  Again, my argument in this paper can be seen in the service of this larger 
                                                 
62 At least, this is the suggestion.  Perhaps American election law should not be directed towards any one 
ideal, but rather it may instantiate a number of conflicting ideals: free expression, equality, association, etc.   
63 GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION viii 
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project.  My claim has been that if we do not recognize certain existing structural 
impediments to better deliberation, or trade-offs we might be forced to make between 
kinds of deliberation, we might end up increasing rather than reducing certain pathologies 
of deliberation.  The barriers to effective deliberation are deep, a fact no one need deny.  
The appeal of Ackerman and Fishkin’s project is that it recognizes the extent we may 
have to go to remove those barriers.  My essay has merely pointed to a few additional 
barriers we will need to overcome. 
But how to overcome those barriers?  Here I reach my final point of clarification, 
and it may represent a real point of difference between my approach and the approach 
that Ackerman and Fishkin take.  As I have stated repeatedly throughout my paper, 
Ackerman and Fishkin have a faith that if we unleash citizen deliberation, then reform 
will emerge, from the bottom up.  They say, as I have quoted them, “if Deliberation Day 
succeed, everything else would change: the candidates, the media, the activists, the 
interests groups, the spin doctors ….”64  The idea is not outlandish, even if it is a little 
optimistic.  If there were a deliberation day, many incentives would change.  But it is 
wrong to think that citizen deliberation, by itself, can make these changes.  Indeed, if the 
electoral structures I have pointed to are not changed first, then deliberation may well be 
counterproductive.  It will not be as wide-ranging as we might have hoped, with the result 
that the two major parities become more entrenched, and debate as result will become 
more impoverished (at best) or polarized (at worst).  So in many cases we will have to 
start from the top down.  And this is where I return to my major theme, which is that 
deliberative democratic theory will need to pay attention to election law, if its proposals 
are to be realistic and effective.  For it is precisely election law and at the limit the 
                                                 
64 DELIBERATION DAY 3.   
 31
Constitution that dictates the larger electoral structure that I have been describing.  As the 
Supreme Court “constitutionalizes democratic politics,” in the words of Richard Pildes,65 
the structure of election law increasingly becomes inscribed into the structure of the 
Constitution itself.  Is the Constitution silent about partisan gerrymanders?  About the 
rights of third parties?  Insofar as more deliberation will make a difference here, it will 
not be the deliberation of ordinary citizens in assemblies first and foremost, but the 
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